Some versions of moral naturalism are faulted for implausibly denying that moral obligations and prescriptions entail categorical reasons for action. Categorical reasons for action are normative reasons that exist and apply to agents independently of whatever desires they have. I argue that several defenses of moral naturalism against this charge are unsuccessful. To be a tenable meta-ethical theory, moral naturalism must accommodate the proposition that, necessarily, if anyone morally ought to do something, then s/he has a categorical reason to do (...) it. Versions of moral naturalism that deny this claim would, if widely believed, disable some crucial practical uses of moral concepts. In particular, if the existence of normative reasons for action is taken to be dependent on agents’ desires, it would breed profound skepticism about the legitimacy of evaluating others’ actions from a moral point of view. Also, it would raise doubts about whether people ought to correct their own behavior in light of moral considerations. Following Richard Joyce, I take these consequences to indicate that the concept of a categorical reason is a “non-negotiable” part of moral concepts. (shrink)

Morally progressive social changes seem to have taken place with the onset of democratic governance, the abolition of slavery, the rise of gender equality, and other developments. This essay attempts to demonstrate that natural and objective moral facts are a plausible cause of some morally progressive social changes. Since this hypothesis is a version of naturalistic moral realism, I call it the Naturalist-Realist Hypothesis. To support the NRH, I argue that objective moral facts are natural facts pertaining to the impartial (...) promotion of well-being within a population of agents facing a social dilemma. I then describe a mechanism to explain how natural and objective moral facts so construed may cause some morally progressive social changes. I suggest that the NRH is a credible hypothesis because it is compatible with empirical findings from research on the evolution of moral cognition and on the sociology of mass political movements. (shrink)

Joaquín M. Fuster is an eminent cognitive neuroscientist whose research over the last five decades has made fundamental contributions to our understanding of the neural structures underlying cognition and behaviour. This book provides his view on the eternal question of whether we have free will. Based on his seminal work on the functions of the prefrontal cortex in decision-making, planning, creativity, working memory, and language, Professor Fuster argues that the liberty or freedom to choose between alternatives is a function of (...) the cerebral cortex, under prefrontal control, in its reciprocal interaction with the environment. Freedom is therefore inseparable from that circular relationship. The Neuroscience of Freedom and Creativity is a fascinating inquiry into the cerebral foundation of our ability to choose between alternative actions and to freely lead creative plans to their goal. (shrink)

This study analyzes the development of a culture of personal transformation in contemporary societies, showing its forms and orientations, and pointing to the factors that favor its development. This new culture unifies psychology and spirituality, emphasizes the transformational power of the experience of transcendence, and flourishes in an heterogeneous and loosely organized milieu driven by trends toward individualization and hybridization. The interpretative hypothesis is that this cultural development is a response to a societal change at the level of the individual: (...) the expansion of the self. The culture of personal transformation can be explained as a response to the existential turmoil that is inherent to the expansion of the self. (shrink)

Abstract In The Descent of Man (1879), Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and in (...) normative attitudes such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: (1) sympathy, (2) our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and (3) our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

This essay proposes and defends a descriptive definition of morality. Under this definition, a moral system is a system of rules, psychological states, and modes of character development that performs the function of enabling mutually beneficial social cooperation. I shall argue that the methodologies employed by two prominent moral psychologists to establish a descriptive definition of morality only serve to track patterns in people’s uses of moral terms. However, these methods at best reveal a nominal definition of morality, since moral (...) appraisers may be ignorant about the referents of their moral terms. I propose a real definition of morality that characterizes moral systems as a natural kind—more precisely, a copied kind. I explain what it takes for a moral system to satisfy this definition, and I identify the sorts of evidence needed to distinguish moral systems from value systems of other kinds. (shrink)

En las investigaciones sobre fisiología cardiovascular desarrolladas por William Harvey es posible distinguir entre dos teorías que responden a preguntas diferentes. La primera de ellas, que denominamos teoría del movimiento circular de la sangre, intenta dar una respuesta al problema sobre la cantidad de sangre que se mueve dentro del sistema. La segunda pretende dar cuenta de las causas de que la sangre se mueva y la denominamos teoría de las causas del movimiento de la sangre. En este trabajo, presentamos (...) una reconstrucción estructuralista de la primera de éstas, y mostramos que posee todos los componentes considerados esenciales para cualquier teoría, de acuerdo con la concepción estructuralista de la ciencia. (shrink)

In his Formal Logic, Arthur N. Prior declared that Jan Łukasiewicz's logical notation is ‘unquestionably the best logical symbolism for most purposes’. Whether he had a substantive, and...

Por estas fechas, hace veinte años, se reunía en la sala de consejos de esta Universidad un grupo numeroso de filósofos, miembros de la Academia de Historia, de la Academia de la Lengua y del Instituto Caro y Cuervo, con el fin de determinar el pensum de la Facultad de Filosofía que se pretendía fundar. Entre los presentes se hallaba un extranjero. En las últimas sesiones, cuando ya la programación de las materias y los contenidos generales de las mismas estaban (...) casi totalmente configurados, el extranjero anotó la ausencia de una materia o de un capítulo extenso dentro de la historia de la filosofía que se denominara_ Historia de la Filosofía Colombiana_ o _Historia de la Filosofía en Colombia_ o algo similar, e insistió en que se llenara ese vacío. Al fin de las deliberaciones la propuesta fue rechazada porque prevaleció la tesis de que en Colombia nunca se había cultivado la filosofía de una forma tal que mereciera el esfuerzo de su estudio y recuperación. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's view of the happy life by sketching out three interconnected themes in his early works. The first theme is the distinction between a science of ethics and the ethical. The second is the idea of the willing subject. And finally, the third is the possibility of the happy life.

Este artículo examina la fenomenología que desarrolló el filósofo chileno Jorge Eduardo Rivera (1927-2017). Primeramente, se destacan algunas características generales de la filosofía de Rivera. Luego, se enjuicia la propuesta heideggeriana de un giro hermenéutico de la fenomenología husserliana que formula Rivera, fijándose especialmente en la interpretación ofrecida de Husserl y en otras posibilidades que ofrece la misma fenomenología. En tercer término, se muestra la concepción universitaria de la filosofía de Rivera, y su identificación de los peligros que acechan a (...) las universidades, sugiriéndose luego otras formas de amenazas universitarias actuales y otras alternativas fenomenológicas para concebir a la universidad contemporáneamente. (shrink)

El presente trabajo propone reconsiderar algunas dificultades clásicas relacionadas con la significatividad y referencia de las proposiciones religiosas y explorar la posibilidad de lidiar con ellas bajo la suposición de que ‘Dios’ es un término teórico, es decir, una palabra que nombra una entidad no susceptible de observación directa pero aun así capaz de cumplir un rol explicativo dentro de teorías que pretenden explicar el mundo disponible a nuestra experiencia. La consideración de ciertos rasgos distintivos de los términos teóricos puede (...) arrojar una luz nueva sobre varias temáticas discutidas en la filosofía de la religión contemporánea, especialmente porque entrega un marco nuevo desde el que pensar la naturaleza y funciones de la teología natural. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 1 Seiten: 130-148.

Este texto analiza la formación del concepto de genealogía en _Teoría e Instituciones Penales_, donde aparece la primera aplicación práctica del método genealógico. La pregunta por el estatuto de la formación de la genealogía nos permitirá plantearnos, a su vez, los límites y los problemas implicados en su emergencia que poseen una relevancia específica para la actualidad del método. Por último, se planteará la actualidad de la genealogía a través de los desarrollos de la obra foucaultiana y las características posibilitadoras (...) y antirrepresentativas de la misma. Todo ello nos permitirá actualizar un método que posee profundas virtudes epistémicas y críticas para pensar nuestro presente. (shrink)

Normative reasons for action are facts or considerations that contribute to the justification of an action. Sometimes, normative reasons for action conflict: one reason may favor doing something, while another may favor not doing it. These conflicts can be so radical that it seems difficult, if not impossible, to judge which reason should ultimately guide one’s actions. According to a theory of practical rationality known as reasons pluralism, there are some radical cases of conflict among normative reasons for action in (...) which there can be no fact of the matter about what one ought to do. This is because normative reasons fall into a plurality of types, and normative reasons of different types are incommensurable with one another. However, reasons pluralism is compatible with a principle that would enable us to judge when a normative reason of one type overrides a normative reason of another type. I will argue that this “Override Principle” is a facet of practical wisdom—an intellectual virtue. Practical wisdom, as Aristotle construed it, involves the ability to order one’s ends into a coherent system that allows for the attainment of a good life. The Override Principle is sure to be one criterion by which those endowed with practical wisdom would order their ends. (shrink)

RESUMEN El presente artículo trata de mostrar las varias y diversas interpretaciones y posiciones existentes con respecto a la filosofía de Feuerbach, lo cual revela la influencia e importancia de su pensamiento. Así mismo, más allá de los diversos intentos por periodizar la obra de Feuerbach, el artículo trata de mostrar en qué medida es posible afirmar la existencia de un principio interno explicativo de su filosofía, el cual puede encontrarse en el concepto mismo de crítica, referido tanto a su (...) método como a su actitud filosófica. Esta crítica tiene, en cualquier caso, un sentido positivo y trata de reafirmar una concepción plena del ser humano. ABSTRACT This paper tries to show the various and diverse interpretations and positions regarding Feuerbach's philosophy, what reveals the influence and importance of his thought. Likewise, beyond the various efforts to periodize Feuerbach's works, it tries to show how it is possible to affirm the existence of an internal explanatory principle to his philosophy, which can be found in the very concept of critique, referring both to his philosophical method and attitude. This critique has, in any case, a positive sense and tries to reassert a full conception of human beings. (shrink)

Jc Beall’s off-topic interpretation of Weak Kleene logic offers a logic of ‘true-and-topic’ preservation. However, Nissim Francez has recently argued that being ‘off-topic’ is a relational and not an _absolute_ semantic property; as such, it fails to satisfy the conditions of truth-functionality. For Francez, this means that it ‘cannot serve as an interpretation of a truth-value’. In this paper, I propose a two-layered _re_interpretation of Beall’s off-topic semantics. This two-layered framework has two crucial features: a sentential topic-tagging device and a (...) two-layered evaluation tool. I show that this framework results in a logic that preserves Beall’s key insight and addresses Francez’s concerns. (shrink)

The debate concerning the proper way of understanding, and hence solving, the “is-ought problem” produced two mutually exclusive positions. One position claims that it is entirely impossible to deduce an imperative statement from a set of factual statements. The other position holds a contrary view to the effect that one can naturally derive an imperative statement from a set of factual statements under certain conditions. Although these two positions have opposing views concerning the problem, it should be evident that they (...) both accept that the “is-ought problem” is concerned with the deducibility of imperative statements from factual statements. Later I will argue that this should not be our concern when we try to make sense of the way we reason about morality. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the problem about the role of academic philosophy for the feminist movement. I argue that the professionalization of feminism, especially within the sphere of academic philosophy, is detrimental to the stated goal of the feminist movement, which, as historically understood, is to procure women’s rights and liberties and to reassess the treatment of women by different social institutions. The thought is that if feminism were to reap the rewards of a socio-political change, feminists should stop (...) their fantastic theorizing and start bringing their advocacies to the proper forums. (shrink)

Da Ré and Szmuc argue that while there is a symmetry between ‘infectious’ and ‘immune’ logics, this symmetry fails w.r.t. extending an algebra with an immune or an infectious element. In this paper, I show that the symmetry also fails w.r.t. defining a new logical operation from a given set of primitive (Boolean) operations. I use the case of the material conditional to illustrate this point.

En el presente artículo se pretende poner en relación la noción de kénosis, sobre la que se configura esencialmente la concepción hermenéutica de la religión en Gianni Vattimo, con la pretensión emancipatoria que surge del nihilismo hermenéutico. Para ello rastrearemos esa concepción hermenéutica de la verdad que ya no nos violenta, a partir de la cual se estructura la religión del pensamiento débil. Además, constataremos cómo la concepción hermenéutica de la metafísica, aparte de presentarse como clave de la secularización, permitirá (...) identificar la salvación con la interpretación. Sobre estos presupuestos generales de su filosofía Vattimo anuncia la venida de Jesús como fenómeno hermenéutico. Tendremos que preguntarnos finalmente si las posibilidades de este planteamiento trágico de la kénosis se llevan hasta sus últimas consecuencias con el anuncio sociopolítico de una emancipación de corte hermenéutico. (shrink)

In The Descent of Man, Charles Darwin proposed a speculative evolutionary explanation of extended benevolence—a human sympathetic capacity that extends to all nations, races, and even to all sentient beings. This essay draws on twenty-first century social science to show that Darwin’s explanation is correct in its broad outlines. Extended benevolence is manifested in institutions such as legal human rights and democracy, in behaviors such as social movements for human rights and the protection of nonhuman animals, and in normative attitudes (...) such as emancipative values and a commitment to promote the rights or welfare of animals. These phenomena can be substantially explained by cultural evolutionary forces that trace back to three components of what Darwin called the human “moral sense”: sympathy, our disposition to follow community rules or norms, and our capacity to make normative judgments. Extended benevolence likely emerged with “workarounds,” including political ideologies, that established an inclusive sympathetic concern for sentient life. It likely became as widespread as it is now due to recently arisen socio-economic conditions that have created more opportunities for people to have contact with and take the perspective of a broader cross-section of humanity, as well as other species. (shrink)

Según la doctrina subjetiva, el significado y el contenido de las disposiciones jurídicas depende de la intención legislativa que las creó. Este método es discutible por varias razones, entre ellas la dificultad de identificar las intenciones legislativas que tienen relevancia para la interpretación. Un aspecto de la dificultad es que en una disposición pueden confluir muchas intenciones diferentes. El objeto del trabajo es catalogar y discutir una serie de intenciones legislativas potenciales cuya respectiva importancia ha de determinar la doctrina subjetiva. (...) Esta diversidad de intenciones se debe tanto a su procedencia como a su contenido y alcance. El trabajo examina primero de quién pueden ser las intenciones legislativas y a continuación cuáles pueden ser. (shrink)

El estudio de los virus ha experimentado una gran transformación en las primeras décadas del siglo XXI. El descubrimiento de los virus gigantes ha hecho que la distinción entre algunos tipos de virus y de bacterias sea cada vez más difusa, lo que obliga a replantearse el estatus epistemológico y ontológico de estas entidades biológicas. Tanto la visión clásica de los virus por parte de la Biología, como las definiciones generales que las autoridades sanitarias, y las definiciones realizadas por virólogos (...) y microbiólogos necesitan ser revisadas para dar cabida a los conocimientos actuales sobre los virus, o más concretamente, sobre los procesos virales. En este proceso de nuevos descubrimientos aparecen nuevos términos, como virión, viroide, virobiota, viroma y virocélula que deben ser tenidos en cuenta e integrados en un nuevo marco ontológico y epistemológico general. Aunque aún estamos lejos de conseguir una definición generalmente aceptada que permita diferenciar nítidamente a los virus de otras entidades biológicas similares, al final del artículo se presenta una definición tentativa, que trata de evitar las limitaciones que presentaban las definiciones anteriores. (shrink)

Ballard et al.'s is a plausible and useful model. Leaving aside some unnecessary constraints, the model would probably be valid through a wider gamut of interactions between the self and the environment than the authors envision.

Moral motivation refers to the psychological causes that motivate or explain moral action. Moral action refers to action that complies with the requirements of morality. In this essay, I lay out alternative views on moral motivation, giving particular attention the way each view conceives of the explanatory link between practical reasoning and moral conduct. In trying to understand this link, philosophers look to moral judgment. The main rival accounts of the relationship between practical reasoning, moral judgment, and moral motivation can (...) be distinguished according to the way in which they respond to two questions: (1) Can a cognitive (i.e., belief-like) state produce in an agent a motivation at time t, without being accompanied by an affective (i.e., emotional or desire-like) state which exists prior to t? (2) Are moral judgments cognitive states or affective states? -/- I shall defend the Humean theory of motivation, or HTM, as the best account of moral motivation. HTM is often called the belief-desire model of action because it explains behavior by citing a combination of a desire for some end and a belief that a certain action is a means to satisfying that desire. The Humean answer to the first question above is that any process of practical reasoning which generates a motivation is necessarily linked to a non-cognitive state. Regarding the second question, Humeans are split between cognitivists and non-cognitivists. Anti-Humeans, on the other hand, hold that moral judgments express cognitive states, and that cognitive states can independently produce motivations via practical reasoning. -/- I offer two arguments in favor of HTM. First, I suggest that Humeanism meets one criterion of theory choice better than anti-Humeanism. This is the continuity constraint. Given that humans and non-humans evolved common ancestors, the continuity constraint advises us to prefer an account of human psychology which can explain how complex human traits evolved from simpler antecedents resembling the traits of non-human animals. Non-human primates, in particular, are capable of acting altruistically toward con-specifics. Altruistic behavior in primates can shed light on an evolutionary precursor to moral action in humans, since morally significant action often involves altruism. I maintain that a Humean theory of motivation offers the best explanation of altruistic behavior in non-human primates. Therefore, by the continuity constraint, HTM should be the preferred model of the psychological mechanisms underlying human moral motivation, unless empirical evidence strongly suggests otherwise. -/- To ward off the objection that anti-Humeanism is warranted due to the vast differences between humans and non-human primates, I offer a second argument for HTM. This is an argument from a criterion of theory choice called Morgan’s Canon. Morgan’s Canon is a standard of theoretical parsimony according to which a psychological mechanism should be attributed to an organism only if it’s the sole mechanism which can cause some behavior. I argue that HTM meets this criterion much better than anti-Humeanism. This is because the special psychological mechanisms which anti-Humeans postulate to explain moral action are not the sole mechanisms which could produce such action. Rather, the Humean belief-desire model could easily be recruited to explain moral action, as well as a broad variety of non-moral actions. (shrink)

In Book I of Plato’s Republic, Thrasymachus famously maintains that ideas of morality and justice are nothing more than an ideology indoctrinated in “the weaker” to benefit “the stronger.” This is Thrasymachus’s challenge to morality: the thesis that some social arrangements, including some moral norms, are products of ‘false consciousness.’ False consciousness occurs when a dominant social group shapes the beliefs and desires of a subordinate group in such a way that the subordinates act for the benefit of the dominants, (...) but against their own interests. In this paper, I grant that some moral norms emerge or persist because of false consciousness. However, I shall argue that these norms actually have the function of impartially promoting the interests of all persons in their range of application. Even if the actual effect of false consciousness norms is to benefit a powerful class while being harmful and discriminatory toward others, the true function of false consciousness norms is the intended effect that they were designed to have. And the crucial feature of false consciousness norms is that their designers—particularly subordinates—teach, preach, follow, and enforce them with the intention of promoting the mutual interests of everyone to whom the norms apply. (shrink)

This article defends a claim about the conditions under which agents possess normative reasons for action. According to this claim, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if it’s psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. The claim is called‘Williams’s explanatory constraint,’since it’s drawn from Bernard Williams’s work on the topic of practical reason. A two-premise‘master argument’ for Williams’s explanatory constraint is put forward. First, an agent has a normative reason to φ only if (...) that agent has the ability to φ for that reason. The second premise states that an agent has the ability to φ for a normative reason only if it’s psychologically possible for that reason to motivate the agent to φ. It is suggested that the ability to act for a normative reason involves the ability to act from a consequence-sensitive process of practical reasoning. Furthermore, normative reasons for action can motivate agents by being the objects of psychological states—particularly beliefs,desires, and intentions. In reply to the objection that normative reasons can never be objects of psychological states, I contend that all normative reasons are capable of being represented as the objects of psychological states. (shrink)

This book introduces profound reflections of Xavier Zubiri on the history of philosophy to English-speaking audiences. The book discusses the transcendental in Western philosophy and how a firm grasp of it reveals underlying unity, but also fundamental problems that Zubiri believed require a complete rethinking of certain theories.

Critical edition, translation and commentary of an epigram addressed by Arias Montano to Hernando Díaz, from a copy probably made by Juan Moreno Ramírez. Diaz was also gifted with knives made by Lancero in Guadalajara.

Sally Haslanger is Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a leading contemporary feminist philosopher. She has worked on analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and ancient philosophy. Her areas of interest are social and political philosophy, feminist theory, and critical race theory. Her 2012 book, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, collects papers published over the course of twenty years that link work in contemporary metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of language with social (...) and political issues concerning gender, race, and the family. It was awarded the 2014 Joseph B. Gittler Prize for “outstanding scholarly contribution in the field of the philosophy of one or more of the social sciences.” In this interview, done in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the #BlackLivesMatter movement, we discuss her ideas on social practices, social structure, and structural explanation. We also delve into her debunking project of elucidating the notion of ideology in a way that links it with contemporary work in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, and to do justice to the materiality of social practices and social structures. (shrink)